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Abstract 
Free trade agreements (FTAs) are about far more than free trade. They are about national security. A 
trade deal may be ambitious in liberalizing or managing cross-border flows in goods, services, 
intellectual property (IP), and people. But, to argue for or against an FTA solely along the axis of free-
versus-managed trade is to miss another vital purpose the deal can, and indeed should, advance: 
national security. 
This article makes two points. First, TPP exemplifies the possibility of national security enhancement 
of the United States. That may occur through the containment of China and its ruling Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). Second, the debate over the definition of “state owned enterprise” (SOE) is 
one among many illustrations in TPP of the link between national security, trade, and containment. 
The 12 nations negotiating TPP were aware of this link, and deliberated the definition of “SOE.” TPP 
excluded the Middle Kingdom from the founding members, while the founders wrote TPP rules to 
bind China if it subsequently joined the deal. Chinese SOEs were of concern to them, for bona fide 
national security reasons, and so also were legitimate sovereign interests in providing goods and 
services through their own SOEs. The evaluation by America and its 11 TPP partners, as to which 
entities should be included in the scope of SOE disciplines, led to a set of clear rules. 
Keywords 
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I. Macbeth’s Pedagogy 
Comprised of 240 lines, Act IV, Scene 3 of Macbeth is the longest scene in that Shakespearean 
tragedy.
1
 The stage is static. The discussion is about what the past teaches the characters for their 
future conduct. What action should they take, given what has happened? Macduff has fled from 
Scotland to England, where he meets Malcolm, son of the victim of regicide, Duncan. Macbeth’s 
murderous tyranny colors the past black: Not only did he have Duncan killed, but also Fleance, son of 
Banquo, plus all of Macduff’s family. Does this past mean Macduff should grieve passively? Or, as 
Malcolm successfully argues, should grief be turned to revenge? 
The Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) is the longest free trade agreement (FTA) in human history. 
With a core text of 30 Chapters, plus 63 Annexes and 61 Side Letters, TPP spans 6,000 pages.
2
 It is far 
easier (and more pleasing) to peruse Act IV, Scene 3, or even the entirety of Shakespeare’s longest 
plays, Hamlet, than it is to read just the core text of TPP or the Side Letters. The core text (excluding 
Chapter-specific Annexes) has 506 Articles, and the Side Letters run 231 pages. There is little in the 
way of stylistic grace. Unlike Shakespeare’s plays, love, beauty, and even truth is not usually its 
concern in TPP. 
Yet, there is a crucial substantive similarity. The debate about what terms TPP ought or ought not 
to contain, and whether TPP ought or ought not to be approved, is a debate about the meaning of the 
past for the future, as is Act IV, Scene 3 of Macbeth. What do pre-TPP FTAs, like the North American 
Free Trade Agreement, and Uruguay Round agreements, teach families around the world about trade 
liberalization? From Kansas City to Kuala Lumpur, this question is being asked. The dominant voice 
in the public discourse is that akin to Malcolm: People, turn your grief over adjustment costs from 
prior trade liberalization into revenge: fight TPP, oppose free trade.
3
 
Past is not prologue, or need not be so, least of all in the modern age of globalization. Lessons for 
the future can inform future conduct. Caution, yes, anger, no.
4
 To take omens from past trade deals as 
all bad, or adopt a near-paranoid opposition to trade liberalization, is to make Macbeth’s mistake. 
From the Three Witches’ prophecies, he drew dreadful inferences. All died as a result – the worst 
                                                     
1
 See SHAKESPEARE’S MACBETH (1606), Act IV, Scene 3, and Commentary, 133-143 (Sidney Lamb, ed., commentary by 
Christopher L. Morrow (2005)). 
2
 The estimate of 6,000 pages is from Free Exchange – A Serviceable Deal, THE ECONOMIST, 14 November 2015, at 76, 
and also Len Bracken, House Vote on TPP Possible in May, June, 32 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 2097 (3 
December 2015). 
3
 A September 2014 Pew Research Center study of 44 countries showed the voice of anger is the loudest one, especially in 
developed countries such as France, Italy, Japan, and the United States. See Faith and Skepticism about Trade, Foreign 
Investment, 16 September http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/09/16/faith-and-skepticism-about-trade-foreign-investment/. 
In the United States, only 20% and 17% think trade generates jobs and boosts wages, respectively. Across the world, just 
31% of people think trade is “very good” for their country. The figures are higher in developing countries: 66% and 55% 
say it increases jobs and wages, respectively, and in Vietnam, 53% say it is very good for their country. Yet, even among 
emerging markets, support for free trade (in terms of agreement with the proposition that trade is good for one’s country) 
dropped between 2010 and 2014 from 84% to 77%. See id. In general, it seems that the more experience a country has 
with trade and investment liberalization, the more developed it is, and/or the larger it is in size, the more skeptical it is of 
the effects of openness on employment and income. 
4
 In April 2014, the USTR published a single-page document of changes to federal law necessary for TPP compliance It 
listed just six minor changes, involving matters like CBP fees and penalties, and Certificates of Origin. See United States 
Trade Representative, Changes to Existing Law Required to Bring the United States into Compliance with Obligations 
Under the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement  
 (1 April 2016), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Changes-to-Existing-Law-Report-FINAL.PDF. Critics charged the 
USTR with understating the effects of TPP. See Brian Flood, White House Releases Proposed Changes to U.S. Law for 
TPP, 33 International Trade Reporter (BNA) (7 April 2016). 
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outcome of any tragedy, one which Macbeth might have avoided with meditation, deliberation, and 
consultation about those prognostications and his circumstances. 
Thankfully, for TPP it is not yet Act V. It is Act I. There is time for critical analysis. This 
remarkable FTA has not (yet) entered into force. Its draft provisions remained classified until 
publication of the final text on 5 November 2015, a month after negotiations finished on 5 October.
5
 
Formal signing occurred on 4 February 2016, roughly coinciding with the 400
th
 anniversary of 
Shakespeare’s death (1564-1616). On 12 August 2016, President Barack H. Obama sent Congress a 
draft Statement of Administrative Action (SAA) for TPP.
6
 Because of the unique importance of TPP – 
strategically, as well as economically – this accord matters far more than other FTAs. 
TPP embodies a connection between trade and national security that is not widely appreciated. 
Here, too, the analogy to Shakespearean drama matters. The Acts and scenes in Macbeth occur in 
Scotland, save for Act IV, Scene 3, which occurs in England. On either side of the border, at a macro 
level, the play is about more than the future economic well-being of Scotland. The security of the 
Scottish realm is in peril, and what foreign intervention (from England) might do to advance that 
security is asked (and answered). Much of the drama surrounding TPP occurs in America, but with 11 
other Parties, not all of it. In the cross-border FTA theater, the macro issues at stake extend beyond 
economic performance to national security. Whether integration and inter-dependence can help 
America is at issue. 
In Act I, Scene I of Macbeth, The Three Witches utter one of the most memorable of all 
Shakespearean lines: “Fair is foul and foul is fair.” What is touted as right may be wrong. What is 
decried as wrong may be right. What appears to be true, may not be reality. So it is with TPP. Time is 
needed to look deeply into its text, motivations, and implications to understand and evaluate it better. 
This article thus presents two points, both tentatively. First, TPP may be appreciated as an exercise in 
containment of China through the rule of law. Second, by way of example, the drive among TPP 
negotiators to define “state owned enterprise” (SOE) is one illustration of this exercise. Both points 
hold true whether or not China joins TPP. 
II. China and SOEs 
TPP matters for America’s strategic pivot from the Middle East to Asia to counter China. Four former 
American Secretaries of State, representing both political parties, have pressed this argument: Henry 
Kissinger (Secretary to Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford from 1973-1977); James 
Baker (Secretary to President George H.W. Bush from 1989-1992); Madeleine Albright (Secretary to 
President Bill Clinton from 1997-2001); and Colin Powell (Secretary to President George W. Bush 
from 2001-2005).
7
 A fifth Secretary of State, John F. Kerry (to President Barack H. Obama from 
2005-2009) obviously agreed:: 
… [E]ither the United States of America is an Asia Pacific power, or we are not. And the “not” 
carries with it serious consequences. … We can’t talk about the rebalance to Asia one day and 
then sit on the sidelines the next, and expect to possibly send a credible message to partners and to 
potential partners around the world. 
… 
                                                     
5
 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the official TPP depositary, published the legally verified text on 26 
January 2016. This version superseded the November version. 
6
 See The Trans Pacific Partnership Implementation Act, Draft Statement of Administrative Action (12 August 2016), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/DRAFT-Statement-of-Administrative-Action.pdf. 
7
 See Cheryl Bolen, Obama Wins TPP Support from Former Top Officials, 32 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 1999 
(19 November 2015). 
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For more than a century, … consistency is exactly what leaders in Asia have come to expect from 
the United States – from leaders in both parties. And there are a host of good reasons for why they 
have come to expect that. 
The first is geography. The United States is one of the few nations that straddles the divide 
between the Eastern and Western hemispheres. Add to that the strong economic bonds that we 
have already developed in the region: five of our top ten trading partners are in Asia. 
And beyond that, you have to remember that our decades-long security alliances and history of 
defense cooperation with Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines stands 
out; …. 
Finally, Asia Pacific countries are major actors on … additional issues that touch on the vital 
national security interests of the United States, and they would be affected by us turning our back 
on an agreement already reached, prompted and promoted by us, led by us, which we then turn 
around and reverse and say, “Sorry, we didn’t mean what we said.” 
… [W]hen crises arise in Asia, the impacts are felt in the United States. And that fact leads to this 
elementary and undeniable truth: it is in our interests to be able to have a positive influence on the 
course of events in Asia. 
And this second fact leads inexorably to a third. The Trans-Pacific Partnership will reinforce our 
status as a world leader intimately connected to the dynamic economies of the Pacific Rim, the 
fastest-growing economies in the world. And it will help strengthen norms and standards that are 
important to us – not just to other people or to everyone else in the region, but important to every 
citizen in the United States of America. 
… 
… [T]here can be no doubt that TPP isn’t simply a stand-whole, standalone deal that just affects 
some trade barriers and some tariff rates. It’s a lot more than that…. It enhances our national 
security. 
… 
… [I]f we retreat from this agreement, every government in the region, every business, every 
labour union, every group of environmental advocates, and the commanders of every army and 
navy will notice. And they will notice it in a way that does not work for the United States of 
America. It will be a unilateral ceding of American political influence and power with grave 
consequences for the long term. 
… They’re going to be asking themselves, hey, if we can’t count on the United States, where else 
should we turn? If the principles and rules written into the TPP don’t matter to the United States, 
why should we accept them? If America won’t enter into partnership with us on economic matters, 
why should we look to Washington for guidance on political or security matters? 
 
The inescapable bottom line is that, with TPP, we will be far better positioned to enhance our 
national security and to protect our interests in the globe’s most dynamic region than we will be 
without this agreement. 
So … the strategic case for TPP is not just crystal clear. It could not be more vital to the national 
security interests and the long-term strategic goals of the United States of America.
8
 
Another distinguished bipartisan group – of 8 former Secretaries of Defense – pressed the argument. 
Harold Brown (1977-81, under President Carter); Frank C. Carlucci 1987-89, under President 
Reagan); William J. Perry (1994-97, under President Clinton,); William S. Cohen (1997-2001, under 
President Clinton); Donald H. Rumsfeld (1975-77, under President Ford, and 2001-06, under President 
Bush); Robert M. Gates (2006-11, under President Bush); Leon E. Panetta (2011-13, under President 
                                                     
8
 John F. Kerry, Secretary of State, Remarks on the Trans Pacific Partnership, The Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., 28 
September 2016, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/09/262551.htm. 
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Obama); and Charles T. Hagel (2013-15, under President Obama) wrote to Congress on 27 April 2016 
that: 
Engagement and leadership on international trade are fundamental to American national security. 
That is a truth recognized by every president since the end of the Second World War. President 
Harry Truman said, “peace, freedom, and world trade are inseparable.” President John F. Kennedy 
stated that, “the success of our foreign policy depends in large measure upon the success of our 
foreign trade,” while President Ronald Reagan noted that, “the freer the flow of world trade, the 
stronger the tides for human progress and peace among nations.” 
… [O]ur engagement and leadership in Asia is especially critical. In fact, no region will impact 
American prosperity and security more in the coming century. By 2030, two-thirds of the world’s 
middle class – more than 3 billion people – will reside in Asia. This population not only represents 
a critical consumer base for Made-in-America exports, but an opportunity to strengthen alliances 
with regional powers such as Japan and Singapore. 
The TPP represents a choice for the United States. It is a choice between leading the world toward 
a future that supports U.S. values and interests, or standing back and allowing others – most likely 
China – to write the rules of the road for Asia in the 21st century. And let us be clear: trade rules 
written by China would not promote a trading system consistent with American interests and 
values. 
… With a trade agreement of this magnitude, there will be elements that some dislike, but the 
overall benefits to our economy and national security cannot be overstated.
9
 … 
Manifestly, their argument is TPP is more than about commerce: It assists in containing China, the rise 
of which is dubiously peaceful. The CCP’s South China Sea claims, and its values, are among the 
reasons (chronicled elsewhere) why China’s rise is “dubious.”10 For now, suffice it to say China poses 
threats (inter alia) with respect to three sets of islands: Spratly Islands; Senkaku Islands; and Taiwan. 
China has long-standing sensitivities about the “Three Ts:” Tibet; Tiananmen Square; and Taiwan. 
Suppose (implausibly) all 12 luminaries are wrong, that none has a clue about TPP or the CCP, and 
each irrationally “connects dots” between TPP rules and China. Facts still are facts, and here are two. 
First, of the 50 largest companies on Fortune’s Global 500 List, 12 are SOEs.11 Indeed, on Forbes’ 
Global 2,000 biggest publicly traded companies: 
204 … [are] majority SOEs with ownership spread across 37 different countries. … China lead[s] 
the list (70 SOEs), followed by India (30), Russia (9), the United Arab Emirates (9) and Malaysia 
(8). The combined sales of the 204 SOEs amount to USD 3.6 trillion in the business year 2010-
2011, … more than 10% of the aggregate sales of the 2,000 largest companies and exceeding the 
2010 Gross National Incomes (GNIs) of … the U.K., France or Germany. The value of sales (USD 
327 billion) of these SOEs is equivalent to almost 6% of world GDP. Their combined market 
value (USD 4.9 trillion) corresponds to 11% of global market capitalisation of all listed 
companies. 
China, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, India, Brazil, 
Norway and Thailand are the ten countries with the highest Country SOE Shares (CSS). … Many 
of the countries with the highest SOE shares are also important traders. This is most notably the 
case for China – the world’s second largest exporter, accounting for more than 10% of world’s 
merchandise exports in 2010, and simultaneously the country with the highest country SOE share. 
This provides an indication as to why China is often mentioned in the context of possible cross-
border effects of SOEs. The seven countries following China in terms of high SOE shares (the 
                                                     
9
 http://csis.org/files/publication/160428_Trans_Pacific_Partnership.pdf (emphasis added) (writing to House Speaker Paul 
Ryan (Republican-Wisconsin), Minority Leader (Nancy Pelosi, Democrat-California), and Senate Majority and Minority 
Leaders (Mitch McConnell, Republican-Kentucky and Harry Reid, Democrat-Nevada, respectively). 
10
 See RAJ BHALA, TPP OBJECTIVELY 6-11 (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press: 2016). 
11
 See Len Bracken, TPP Seeks to Lower Tariff Barriers Faced by U.S. Exports, Froman Says, 32 International Trade 
Reporter (BNA) 417 (26 February 2015). 
TPP, American National Security, and Chinese SOEs 
 5 
United Arab Emirates, Russia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, India and Brazil) together 
accounted for an additional 10.4% of world trade. Thus, the eight countries with the highest SOE 
shares collectively account for more than 20% of world trade.
12
 
The prominence of Chinese and Malaysian SOEs is particularly noteworthy. In the TPP context, SOE 
rules are designed to put disciplines on Chinese SOEs, should China eventually join the deal, and in 
the meantime on Malaysian (plus other Party) SOEs. 
But, why might Chinese SOEs threaten American national security? Dennis Shea, Chairman, 
United States – China Economic Security Review Commission told Congress: Chinese SOEs are 
“‘arms of the Chinese state’ and act for strategic purposes.”13 He and the Commission called for a ban 
on them buying American companies: 
Despite repeated pledges to let the market play a “decisive role” in resource allocation, Beijing 
continues to use state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as a tool to pursue social, industrial, and foreign 
policy objectives, offering direct and indirect subsidies and other incentives to influence business 
decisions and achieve state goals. While proposed SOE reforms have made little progress 
incorporating market drivers into SOE activities or addressing the country’s growing credit crisis, 
they have taken steps to strengthen state control – particularly in sectors involving the 
government’s political or economic interests.
14
 
Thus, the Commission recommended amending the statute authorizing the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to bar Chinese SOEs from U.S. company acquisitions.
15
 
III. Defining “SOE” 
If FTAs are about national security as well as trade, and if TPP is about both containing China and 
trade liberalization, then what should TPP rules on SOEs say? The short answer is they should level 
the playing field on which SOEs and private entities compete. But, that answer begs a vital question 
with which TPP negotiators grappled: what is the definition of an “SOE”? That is, what “SOEs” 
should TPP cover? 
TPP negotiating countries agreed the percentage of government ownership ought to be the key 
criterion delineating an “SOE.”16 The problem was they could not agree on a percentage figure. The 
United States was concerned about precedent as to both the percentage and scope issues. 
Provisions in TPP on SOEs could become a template for future RTAs, and perhaps the WTO. The 
GATT-WTO texts speak of SOEs operating in accordance with normal commercial considerations. 
Ideally, TPP would lay out whether a matter or decision concerning or by an SOE affects non-SOE 
                                                     
12
 Przemyslaw Kowalski, Max Büge, Monika Sztajerowska & Matias Egeland, State-Owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and 
Policy Implications, OECD TRADE POLICY PAPER Number 147, TAD/TC/WP(2012)10/FINAL, 6 (22 March 2013), 
http://www.oecd.org/trade (emphasis added). 
13
 Quoted in Len Bracken, Hill Panel Pushes for Limits on Chinese Investments in U.S., International Trade Daily (BNA) 
(16 November 2016). 
14
 UNITED STATES – CHINA ECONOMIC SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, Executive 
Summary and Recommendations, at 5, 
 http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/Executive%20Summary%202016.pdf. [Hereinafter, CHINA 
COMMISSION.] 
15
 CHINA COMMISSION, at 507, 
 http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/Comprehensive%20List%20of%20Recommendations_1.pdf 
16
 See Len Bracken, Ryan Reaffirms Goal of Reaching Agreement on TPP in Meetings With Singapore Officials, 32 
International Trade Reporter (BNA) 375 (19 February 2015); Len Bracken, Good TPP Market Access Deal Needed To 
Resolve Rules Issues, Brilliant Says, 31 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 1975 (6 November 2014). 
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17
 The United States argued TPP negotiations 
should deal specifically with situations such as where an SOE:
18
 
(1) enjoys advantages in its home country, such as direct support, preferential financing, 
selective enforcement of laws, or regulatory exemptions; 
(2) from one country and private business association of another country compete in that other 
country, or in a third country; 
(3) is engaged in government procurement; 
(4) is a holding company with many entities under it; 
(5) gains preferential access to export credits; and 
(6) benefits from exemptions in domestic bankruptcy law that allow it to continue in operation. 
Such topics deserved coverage, given the prominence of SOEs in many countries. 
For example (as of March 2012), SOEs constitute 80% of the value of China’s stock market, 62% 
of the market capitalization of the Russian stock market, and 38% of that in Brazil.
19
 SOEs also play 
prominent roles in Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam.
20
 SOEs accounted for 50% of the stock market 
capitalization in Malaysia, and 20% in Singapore.
21
 In Vietnam, SOEs accounted for 38% of GDP, and 
25-30% of government revenue. 
Unsurprisingly, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam resisted disciplines on their SOEs.
22
 A poignant 
example is Vinatex, which is owned by the government, and is the largest apparel exporter from 
Vietnam. America sought disciplines on it, which would be consistent with a restrictive T&A ROO.
23
 
In Japan, the Post Office is an SOE. In the United States, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may be 
considered as such. And, in some countries – Vietnam, for example – SOEs reportedly “are used by 
senior Communist Party officials as a cash cow for favoured projects and sometimes as personal piggy 
banks.”24 
If America had its way, then TPP would be the first trade agreement to contain a full Chapter on 
disciplines on SOEs. The concern about the un-level playing field they enjoyed in their domestic 
markets was known for decades, even when GATT was drafted in 1945-1947. However, the increased 
                                                     
17
 See Len Bracken, TPP Customs, Trade Facilitation Text is “Particularly Far Advanced,” Froman Says, 31 International 
Trade Reporter (BNA) 502 (13 March 2014). 
18
 See Len Bracken, TPP Members Grapple with Japan’s Entry, Ways to Speed Talks Ahead of 17th Round, 30 International 
Trade Reporter (BNA) 495 (4 April 2013). 
19
 See Murray Griffin, TPP Should Set Benchmark for Rules on State-Owned Enterprises, Forum Told, 29 International 
Trade Law Reporter (BNA) 370 (8 March 2012). 
20
 See Len Bracken, TPP Talks in Bali Focus on Environment, Intellectual Property, State-Owned Enterprises, 30 
International Trade Reporter (BNA) 1563 (10 October 2013). 
21
 See Len Bracken, U.S. Seeking to Limit Exceptions to Rules on SOEs, 32 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 1350 (30 
July 2015) (citing statistics from the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) report, Policy 
Brief on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises in Asia: Recommendations for Reform). 
22
  See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, TPP Ministers Wrap Up Meeting With No Deal or New Deadline, 30 International Trade 
Reporter (BNA) 1916 (12 December 2013) (reporting on Malaysian resistance to SOE commitments). 
23
 See Bryce Baschuk, High-Level Interventions Required to Resolve TPP Disagreements on Market Access Issues, 32 
International Trade Reporter 708 (BNA) (16 April 2015). 
24
 David Pilling & Shawn Donnan, Ocean’s Twelve, FINANCIAL TIMES, 23 September 2013, at 9. See also Michael E. 
Martin, U.S. – Vietnam Trade Relations: Issues for the 113th Congress, Congressional Research Service 7-5700, R41550 
(13 August 2014) (stating Vietnam “remains a mixed economy with considerable government intervention”); Rossella 
Brevetti, CRS Says Vietnam’s TPP Participation Could Complicate U.S. Negotiating Position, 31 International Trade 
Reporter (BNA) 1575 (4 September 2014) (discussing the CRS Report). 
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prominence of SOEs, and particularly the fact their activities no longer are limited to their home 
countries, but extend into foreign markets, impelled TPP negotiators to deal with them.
25
 
Doing so created controversy. Developing countries argued for generous transition periods. They 
needed time for their SOEs to transition toward commercial-based decision-making.
26
 But, with an eye 
to writing rules to which China would have to adhere if it acceded to TPP, disciplining Chinese SOEs 
was a priority. Thanks to “powerful interests that stretch as high as the 25-man central committee of 
the Communist Party,” internally-catalyzed reform was stymied. Quoting Sheng Hong, Executive 
Director, Unirule Institute of Economics, a Beijing-based think tank, it was reported: 
China has developed a series of administrative monopolies that receive a range of advantages from 
central government, and benefit a powerful elite…. Unirule … defines these as monopolies 
established by administrative departments that have access to exceptional advantages and are often 
protected by barriers to entry and regulating prices. 
And there is a “revolving door” between the boards of directors of these companies and high levels 
of the governmental administration that gives them “strong political resources,” Sheng said. 
 “China should break the administrative monopolies,” he said. “It would make it easier to argue 
that it is a market economy and would be beneficial to the economy.” 
… 
… [A]ccording to Unirule research published in 2012, and based on the resumes of 183 officials 
above vice ministerial level in 19 government ministries and commissions 56 people (30 percent) 
had previously worked in … SOEs. 
 “In addition, a resume survey of the senior executives of 123 central SOEs shows that 115 senior 
administrators at the 47 enterprises that disclosed this information had a background working for 
the government; in other words, each enterprise has an average of 2.45 people with a government 
background,” the Unirule research found. 
Among the advantages these companies enjoy are the use of national land free of charge, low 
interest rate loans, subsidies from the government and developing rights at very low royalty levels. 
These advantages can add up to several trillion yuan per year, according to Sheng. 
… 
Nevertheless, they still significantly underperform private-sector companies, according to Unirule 
research. From 2001 to 2009, the average return on equity of Chinese SOEs was 8.16 percent, 
compared to 12.9 percent for non-state-owned companies, the research revealed. In 2009 the gap 
had widened to 8.18 percent for SOEs compared to 15.59 percent for private firms. And this does 
not take into account the substantial advantages that SOEs receive. 
Taking into account the rent that SOEs would pay as private enterprises, preferential financing 
costs, low taxes, subsidies and other factors, the average real return on equity of SOEs from 2001 
to 2009 was -6.29 percent, according to Unirule. Later research showed a real return on investment 
in 2013 of -3.8 percent. Despite this, average wages in SOEs were 17 percent higher than in other 
organizations in 2008, while staff also can receive cheap housing. 
Although the companies are state-owned, they give little of their profits to the government. 
Between 1994 and 2007 SOEs gave none of their profits to the state, … with the figure rising to 6 
percent in 2008 and falling again to 2.2 percent in 2010. The benefits of state support are instead 
kept largely within the companies, which can set their own compensation levels for employees. 
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“The management of state-owned enterprises have the privilege to give the salary and bonuses 
they want, and they also have privilege to not hand on all of the profits to the nation,” Sheng said. 
“It is regarded by them as their benefit.”
27
 
In brief, aggressive rules in TPP would help counter favourable treatment SOEs receive, and even 
have knock-on benefits of breaking up governmental administrative monopolies that protect them, and 
closing the revolving door between those bodies and the SOEs. 
Not all TPP Parties aligned with the dark, Chinese-driven American view of SOEs. Australian 
health organizations feared TPP provisions on SOEs would damage state-owned public hospitals.
28
 
That could happen if (1) the definition of “SOE” was unclear, or (2) those provisions applied not only 
to central governments, but also provincial ones. On the one hand, it was understandable to ensure 
through SOE disciplines that if they compete commercially with private enterprises, they do not 
receive unfair advantages from their state owners. On the other hand, SOEs that exist for a public 
purpose, even if they have some commercial operations, should be exempt. Examples included not 
only Australian hospitals, but also the Australia Post and the National Broadband Network. 
Accordingly, these organizations championed a clear exclusion of such entities from the “SOE” 
definition. 
Certainly, the United States was concerned about crafting the definition of “SOE.”29 It needed to be 
broad enough to encompass activities of entities that truly are governmental or acting as agents for a 
government and are engaged in commercial trade. But, there had to be carefully crafted exemptions. 
The definition should not include universities, public utilities, or hospitals. Relatedly, SOEs ought to 
be subject to the same dispute settlement mechanism, and held to the same high standards of 
transparency, as private enterprises under the TPP. Further, perhaps some disciplines on SOEs should 
not apply horizontally to all SOEs. For instance, domestic public transportation services, or overseas 
investment, possibly should be exempt from competition rules otherwise applicable to SOEs.
30
 More 
generally, perhaps whole service areas – like public health and transportation – should be exempt from 
the definition of “SOE,” or at least from disciplines on “SOEs.” But, the United States insisted on an 
ambitious definition and a mandate that any SOE make employment, investment, and other decisions 
based on commercial considerations, not other criteria like social or national security.
31
 
Also in the United States, the AFL-CIO had its own concerns. As with any trade agreement, the 
TPP galvanized labour unions around issues of wage degradation and job loss.
32
 Additionally, the 
AFL-CIO drew a link between foreign SOEs and national security threats.
33
 It called for an automatic 
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trigger of a national security review by CFIUS for any investment of a foreign SOE in America. This 
trigger, said the AFL-CIO, should be built into the domestic regulatory requirement provisions of the 
TPP. The purpose of such a review would be not only to ensure sensitive goods or technologies do not 
fall into enemy hands, but also to check that a would-be foreign SOE acquirer behaves like a 
commercial enterprise and does not “corner” a market in the United States.34 
By the July 2015 Maui negotiations, the issues of defining “SOE” had been agreed upon: roughly 
50% or more government ownership.
35
 The exact figure varied with the number of government 
officials on the Board of Directors of the enterprise: fewer government officials on the Board would 
mean a higher percentage threshold, whereas more government officials on the Board would mean a 
lower threshold. There were 2 reasons for the inverse relationship between (1) percentage ownership 
by the government and (2) government officials on the Board. First, in theory, these 2 variables were 
alternative (and complimentary) ways a government could influence SOE decision-making. Second, in 
practice, some TPP Parties, such as Vietnam, planned partial government divestments of certain 
SOEs. So, if their thresholds fell below the 50% threshold after the IPOs, but they still influenced SOE 
operations via Board membership, then the affected SOEs should be covered.  
The second issue, deciding what SOEs to cover, boiled down to the question of sector-wide 
exceptions. Those exceptions were dubbed “NCMs,” or “Non-Conforming Measures” (akin to the use 
of the term in the context of investment, services, and financial services). Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Vietnam sought to exclude entire categories of SOEs from any TPP disciplines. For example, 
Malaysia wanted to exclude “public transportation services.” Vietnam sought to exempt (at least for a 
defined transition period) “telecommunications,” “textile,” and “shipping.” Singapore wanted to revise 
commitments it had made under its 2004 FTA with the United States, in which competition law 
provisions applied to subsidiaries of the SOE Temasek, such as Temasek Holdings Private Ltd., but 
not to Temasek as a holding company.
36
 
On the second issue, the American posture was radically different from (at least) Malaysia and 
Singapore.
37
 First, the United States declared there should be no sector-wide exceptions. Rather, 
NCMs should be confined to SOEs that are specifically named. Second, no NCM should be 
permanent. Rather, it should be temporary, for a period in which the named SOE can adjust to 
competition from the private sector. Third, NCMs should be limited to just three types of TPP 
disciplines: subsidies, regulatory benefits, or government direction of decision-making. That is, a 
specifically named SOE could, for a brief transition period, (1) receive a subsidy, (2) enjoy special 
regulatory treatment (such as forbearance from duties incumbent on private sector entities), or (3) 
benefit from government direction. That was it. Fourth, the United States insisted on rigorous 
transparency rules. They were essential to ensure SOEs operated based on commercial considerations, 
not for governmental strategic reasons, such as gaining market share (at whatever cost) or enhancing 
employment (to maintain social peace or fulfill quotas). Fifth, America wanted all disputes involving 
SOEs to be subject to the ISDS mechanism it championed. 
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That the official American position carried out the agenda of Corporate America was not in doubt. 
Understandably, American private sector companies sought a level playing field with Asian SOEs.
38
 
That it also accorded with the view of organized labour was notable. It was a rare instance in which 
American unions agreed with management. 
Embedded in the second issue of sector-wide exemptions from the definition of “SOEs” was a 
topic over which the commercially-oriented American approach rode roughshod: cultural exemptions. 
Some SOEs play an important role in maintaining, elaborating, and promulgating the traditions and 
values of a country, and advance its intellectual life and public discourse. Prominent examples are 
certain media outlets, such as the CBC.
39
 Would TPP require the Canadian government to privatize the 
country’s oldest broadcast network, CBC?40 The same question applied to the ABC. As a prominent 
critic of TPP, University of Auckland Professor Jane Kelsey, a prominent TPP critic, put it: 
The reality [is] that SOEs and private firms are driven by different imperatives and obligations. 
SOEs are almost always state owned because they have functions other than those that are merely 
commercial, such as guaranteed access to important services, or because social, cultural, 
development and commercial functions are inextricably intertwined….
41
 
Thus, she rightly cautioned against a draconian TPP mandate that would amount to a “backdoor to 
privatization” of all SOEs. 
In the end, TPP Chapter 17, concerning SOEs, admitted the possibility of NCMs. Parties were free 
to schedule them in general Annex IV. Save for Japan and Singapore, all Parties did so. That Annex 
consists of 59 pages of technical SOE reservations, or about six pages per Party. Just how restrictive 
those NCMs are requires detailed analysis of each of them. Nevertheless (as exposed elsewhere), 
Chapter 17 disciplines SOEs through five vital categories of rules: (1) a national treatment; (2) a 
requirement of operation in accordance with “commercial considerations,” (3) a prohibition on 
“commercial assistance” that causes “adverse effects or “injury;” (4) a transparency mandate; and (5) a 
sovereign immunity waiver. 
IV. Tragedy is Not Inevitable 
Shortly after his November 2016 election to the Presidency, Donald J. Trump declared his intention to 
withdraw from TPP on Day One as President.
42
 (Technically, that YouTube pronouncement was off.
43
 
Because TPP had not taken effect, there was no treaty from which to withdraw – only a signature to 
pull off the page.) His reasons for “withdrawal” were a confused protectionist admixture: 
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“The administration believes in free, fair trade,” Anthony Scaramucci, a member of the 
presidential transition team’s executive committee [and founder of the Wall Street hedge fund 
management firm, SkyBridge Capital LLC], said Dec. 1 [2016]. “However, if we’re going to get 
some contention related to trying to make those deals fairer, so that our goods and services can 
leave the United States in the same proportion that they’re coming in, then the cudgel of a tariff is 
something that we on the administration side would be willing to impose as a sort of negotiating 
chip.”
44
 
There was no underlying philosophy or definition of free, fair, or managed trade, or mercantilism, in 
this rhetoric. If a “cudgel” was a negotiating tactic, then its overuse would condemn it as bluster to be 
ignored rather than ideas to be weighed. Rightly so, the USTR replied: “Killing TPP on day one is a 
huge gift to China. There is way too much at stake for this to be killed, economically and 
strategically,” and added there is an “inherent tension between being tough on China [on trade issues] 
and killing TPP.”45 
In response, other TPP Parties doubled down on the importance of trade liberalization. For 
example, in its 30 November 2016 report, Australia’s Joint Standing Committee on Treaties declared it 
“is particularly concerned that Australia’s long-term commitment to free trade, from which Australia 
benefits immensely, is currently at risk from a resurgence of nationalism and isolationism 
internationally.”46 Both the Australian government and opposition Labour Party endorsed the report 
and recommended TPP ratification.
47
 The report concluded TPP “represents the best possibility in at 
least 20 years to develop a multilateral free trade agreement.”48 To be sure, Labour was “disappointed 
that the TPP contains provisions that are well outside the core purpose of achieving fair and free trade, 
and that some of these provisions are not only extraneous, but risky or harmful to Australia’s 
interests,” and listed their principal objections as “expanded monopoly rights protection for 
pharmaceuticals which may impose costs on health consumers or on the public health system” (claims 
to the contrary were “disingenuous”) and the ISDS mechanism.49 The Green Party dissented, opposing 
TPP ratification and lambasting the agreement as “a deal cobbled together behind closed doors by big 
business for big business.”50 
As another example, Vietnam continued with a breathtaking array of reforms designed for TPP 
ratification: 
As Donald Trump prepares to kill the … TPP, the 12-nation trade pact is helping to spur the 
biggest overhaul of Vietnam's economy in decades. 
The Communist government in Hanoi plans to push ahead with more than 30 separate pieces of 
legislation proposed to comply with the trade deal, including rules on labour, business, foreign 
trade and small-and-medium enterprises. Since a new constitution was adopted in 2013, Vietnam’s 
lawmakers have passed more than 100 laws – a scale of change unseen since the nation introduced 
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the market-oriented “doi moi” reforms in the 1980s. [In Vietnamese, “Ðơi” means life, and “Mơí” 
means “new.” Thus, “Ðơi Mơí” connotes new life, in the sense of new attitude and hope.] 
… 
Vietnam has long been seen as one of the biggest potential winners from the TPP, with increased 
market access for everything from clothing to electronics to footwear. The deal also stood to 
complement a growing strategic relationship between the U.S. and Vietnam, which opposes 
China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. 
Yet all isn’t lost: The TPP also helped serve as an impetus for long-needed structural changes in a 
nation with 90 million people that’s forecast to grow more than 6 percent this year – one of the 
fastest rates in Asia. While Vietnam first announced plans to reform its state-owned enterprises in 
2011, progress has been slow, with the stakes sold often too small and many companies pulling 
back on plans to list on exchanges. 
… 
… TPP also has helped raise awareness among key stakeholders including state officials, 
employers, trade unions, workers and the general public on the implications of free trade. 
Vietnamese business leaders also appear keen to maintain the reform momentum generated by the 
TPP. 
Alan Pham, chief economist at Vietnam’s largest fund manager VinaCapital Group, says the TPP 
is a kind of road map for Vietnam as it integrates further into the global economy. 
 “Whether we have TPP or not, Vietnam will still have to reform,” Pham said. “The trade pact is 
really useful for the government and for Vietnamese business to know what are the steps they will 
need to take to really become part of the global economy.” 
Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc said last month that Vietnam would pursue greater 
international integration through 12 other free trade agreements it had already signed even if the 
TPP falls through. 
“So it’ll be very good to have TPP, but if not, we still have other integration plans to go with,” 
Phuc said.
51
 
Notably, Japan ratified TPP. Its House of Councillors (the Upper House of the National Diet 
(Parliament)) approved the deal on 9 December 2016, following the House of Representatives 
approval on 10 November 2016.
52
 
Might America do well to draw inspiration from the likes of Australia, Vietnam, and Japan – two 
of which it had once fought bitter wars against in unison with the third – and rethink “withdrawal” 
from TPP? Perhaps the answer is what Macbeth says (in Act I, Scene 7, Lines 1-7), when he ponders 
assassinating King Duncan of Scotland: 
If it were done, when ‘tis done, then ‘twere  
well 
It were done quickly; if the assassination 
Could trammel up [catch in a net] the  
consequence, and catch 
With his surcease, success: that but this 
blow 
Might be the be-all and the end-all. Here, 
But here, upon this bank and shoal of time, 
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We’d jump [risk] the life to come. 
Like killing Duncan, killing (or modifying or expanding) TPP, is not a simple matter. Whatever move 
America makes in any dimension of international trade law and policy has “consequences,” some of 
which it neither can foresee nor steer, in the present (“this bank and shoal of time”) or the future (“the 
life to come”). Some moves set precedents, too, as Shakespeare did in Macbeth with the first recorded 
use of the word “assassination.”53 But, even they are not necessarily the end of the matter, the “be all 
and end all.” 
In short, if America makes a mistake on TPP, it is not the “be all and end all.” That mistake might 
still be rectified. But like killing Duncan, the killing of TPP could have injurious effects on the 
national security of the nation. 
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